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Ethical sensemaking is a process of gathering and organizing information in a 
meaningful way to guide understanding of a situation.  Ethical situations in 
organizations are dynamic with new information often emerging over time.  How one 
processes new information and incorporates it into their understanding of a situation can 
be affected by emotions, decision framing, and the degree to which the new information 
confirms or conflicts with initial information about the situation.  This study examined 
the impact of the discrete emotions of anger and guilt, ethical framing, and confirmation 
bias on ethical sensemaking processes and decision ethicality when new information 
was introduced, information that either conflicted with or was consistent with what 
participants already knew about a challenging organizational situation. Anger and guilt 
negatively impacted several sensemaking strategies. Anger led to lower decision 
ethicality compared to both guilt and neutral conditions. Mediational effects of 
confirming and conflicting information on emotions and sensemaking processes were 
also found. Practical and theoretical implications and areas for future research are 
discussed. 




When faced with an ethical dilemma, individuals are usually confronted with 
numerous pieces of information.  Information can be emotionally charged, incomplete, 
conflicting, and change over time.  For example, the Wells Fargo accounts scandal in 
2016 unfolded over several months.  In September of 2016, Wells Fargo was fined $185 
million because employees were opening accounts without customer authorization.  The 
bank became aware of the issue in 2013 and have since traced the misconduct to have 
occurred as far back as 2009.  The information regarding the misconduct grew over 
time, resulting in 5,300 employees being terminated due to the misconduct (Blake, 
2016).  Another major scandal in 2016 was Mylan’s EpiPen scandal.  The public 
became outraged about the 400% price increase since 2007 and the U.S. Congress held 
an investigation by the House Oversight Committee.  The information reveled from 
testimony in the investigation led to the New York state attorneys general to investigate 
Mylan over antitrust violations and the West Virginia state attorneys general to 
investigate Mylan for Medicaid fraud (Matthews & Heimer, 2016).  As demonstrated by 
these two scandals, it is common for additional information to unfold over time in 
ethical dilemmas and this information may impact sensemaking and decision ethicality.  
Therefore there is a need to understand how individuals integrate information during the 
sensemaking process and make decisions when faced with ethical dilemmas. 
A number of factors are known to influence sensemaking and decision ethicality 
(Mumford et al., 2008; Ness & Connelly, in press; Thiel, Bagdasarov, Harkrider, 
Johnson, & Mumford, 2012).  Ethical sensemaking is the process of gathering 
information in order to construct a mental model to help guide understanding of a 
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situation (Mumford et al., 2008).  During ethical sensemaking, the decision maker 
identifies the causes, potential constraints, and engages in forecasting. Ultimately 
ethical sensemaking leads to decisions. The process of sensemaking is influenced by 
various situational and personal factors including emotion and cognitive biases.  It is 
common for emotional reactions to occur when an individual is faced with an ethical 
dilemma (Gaudine & Thorne, 2001; Mumford et al., 2008; Thiel et al., 2012).  Affective 
events theory maintains that organizational events can trigger affective responses in 
employees which can impact attitudes, cognition, and behavior (Weiss & Cropanzano, 
1996).  Specifically, these emotional reactions can impact cognitive processes (Angie, 
Connelly, Waples & Kligyte, 2011; Lench, Flores, & Bench, 2011; Lerner, Li, 
Valdesole, & Kassam, 2015) and ethical sensemaking processes (Johnson, 2015).  
Attitudes, cognition, and behavior are also affected by cognitive biases (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1977; 1982; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981).  Ethical dilemmas are ambiguous 
and complex which can lead individuals to apply cognitive shortcuts to their reasoning 
in order to understand the situation.  These shortcuts can increase the likelihood of an 
individual engaging in cognitive biases (Das & Teng, 1999; Hodgkinson, 2001; Maule 
& Hodgkinson, 2002; Schwenk, 1995).  The use of cognitive biases may impact the 
ethicality of an individual’s decision (Rogerson, Gottlieb, Handelsman, Knapp, & 
Younggren, 2011).  However, there are a number of unresolved questions about how 
emotions and cognitive biases might influence ethical sensemaking and there are no 
studies examining their joint influence on sensemaking and decision ethicality. 
Since the 1980’s the study of emotions in work settings has exploded 
(Ashkanasy & Humphrey, 2011).  Vitell, King, and Singh (2013) emphasized the 
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importance of looking at the effects of specific emotions (versus general positive or 
negative affect) on ethical decision making because different discrete emotions may 
exert influence in different ways.  In the current study, two specific emotions are 
studied - anger and guilt.  Anger and guilt were chosen because they share many 
patterns of appraisal but differ with respect to agency, or who or what caused goal 
blockage (Roseman, 1996, Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).  Only one study has examined 
and compared anger and guilt using an ethical sensemaking framework (Johnson, 
2015). 
During the process of sensemaking, an individual creates a mental model and 
decision frames can influence the creation of that mental model. In fact, Sunstein (2007) 
states that information can be framed in such a way to shift an individual’s ethical 
assessment in the desired direction. Framing can affect how the ethical dilemma is 
construed which could impact the nature and extent of the use of various sensemaking 
processes and overall decision ethicality.  Additionally, individuals tend to prefer 
information that supports their initial understanding of an issue and negate information 
that conflicts with their initial understanding of the issue (Festinger, 1957; Frey, 1986). 
Confirmation bias is identified as a potential bias that can affect ethical sensemaking 
(Hammond, Keeney, & Raiffa, 1998) but there is a lack of experimental studies 
examining how it impacts ethical decision making. In this study confirmation bias is 
examined as a mediator between emotions and ethical sensemaking, and framing and 
ethical sensemaking. 
The goals of this study are to extend research on ethical sensemaking by 
examining the impact of emotions, ethical framing, and confirmation bias on 
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sensemaking processes and decision ethicality.  Specifically,  we will examine two 
discrete emotions with negative valence, anger and guilt and their impact on 
sensemaking and decision ethicality.  While prior research has shown that cognitive 
biases impact ethical decision making (Rogerson et al., 2011; Medeiros et al., 2014; 
Messick & Bazerman, 1996), there are none that we know of that examine ethical 
framing and confirmation bias.  This study examines the main effects and joint 
influences of ethical framing and emotions on ethical sensemaking; the impact of 
confirmation bias on ethical sensemaking; and the mediational effects of confirmation 
bias on ethical framing and ethical sensemaking, and emotions and ethical sensemaking. 
Ethical Sensemaking 
Recent models of ethical decision making account for the affective, intuitive, 
and impulsive aspects of the ethical decision making process (e.g. Detert, Treviño, & 
Sweitzer, 2008; Gaudine & Thorne, 2001; Haidt, 2001; Mumford et al., 2008; 
Sonenshein, 2007).  Ethical sensemaking involves a number of cognitive and affective 
process related to gathering information, interpreting and organizing information, and 
applying that information to make a decision (Mumford et al., 2008; Sonenshein, 2007).  
During sensemaking, an individual frames an experience as being meaningful in some 
specific way by creating a mental model to help guide the ethical decision making 
process (Brock et al., 2008; Kligyte et al., 2008; Mumford et al., 2008; Sonenshein, 
2007).  Additionally, cognitive and behavioral actions are taken by the decision maker 
in order to integrate both situational and personal factors (Weick, 1995).  Examining 
ethical decision making through the lens of sensemaking allows for further exploration 
into how individuals perceive, evaluate, and make decisions about an ethical dilemma. 
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Sensemaking processes are the foundational operations underlying mental model 
construction during ethical sensemaking (Mumford et al., 2008).  Sensemaking 
processes include the identification of key causes, identification of key constraints, and 
forecasting consequences of various solution alternatives (Brock et al., 2008; Katz, 
Caplan, & Merz, 2010; Mumford et al., 2008).  Causes are objects that are most central 
to the initiation and subsequent unfolding of the ethical dilemma.  When identifying key 
causes, individuals will also identify the relative importance of the causes (Mumford et 
al., 2008). Various factors that can limit potential courses of actions in response to the 
dilemma are called constraints. Examples of possible constraints are limited resources, 
interpersonal issues, and procedural issues. Constraints can vary in breadth and the 
severity of their impact (Mumford et al, 2008). Forecasting involves thinking about 
possible actions and the impact of those actions on individuals, groups, the 
organization, and other relevant stakeholders.  Forecasts can be positive or negative, 
have a long or short timeframe, and vary in quality (Stenmark et al., 2010).  
Sensemaking processes allow an individual to construct a mental model of the ethical 
issues at hand by enabling the evaluation of the plausibility and usefulness of various 
courses of action with consideration of situational and personal parameters. The use of 
sensemaking processes increases decision ethicality (Antes et al., 2007; Bagdasarov et 
al., 2015; Caughron et al., 2011; Kligyte, Connelly, Thiel, & Devenport, 2013; 
Mumford et al., 2006; 2008; Stenmark et al., 2010; 2011; Thiel et al., 2011). Several 
studies have established that sensemaking processes play a mediating role to ethical 
decision making (Bagdasarov et al., 2015; Stenmark et al., 2011; Johnson, 2015). The 
sensemaking processes and ultimately, decision ethicality can be impacted by various 
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factors. Next, we provide overviews of the potential roles of decision framing, 
emotions, and confirmation bias in ethical sensemaking and ethical decisions. 
Framing 
When engaged in sensemaking, framing guides how a problem is defined 
initially.  Decision frames are cognitive structures used to organize information and 
expectations about a given situation in order to facilitate understanding of the situation 
(Gioia, 1992).  Within a decision frame, an individual is able to organize all aspects 
associated with a particular choice including specific acts, possible outcomes, and 
contingencies (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).  Simply put, frames are “mental structures 
that simplify and guide our understanding of a complex reality” (Russo & Shoemaker, 
2004 p. 21). 
The type of decision frame used to anchor sensemaking impacts an individual’s 
final decision by influencing the interpretation of information, events, and people in the 
situation.  Decision frames exert powerful influences on how individuals think about 
and respond to a situation (Treviño, den Nieuwenboer, & Kish-Gephart, 2014).  A 
decision frame promotes identification and evaluation of specific causes, constraints, 
and forecasted outcomes (Entman, 1993).  Different decision frames could possibly lead 
to different understandings of the same situation because a decision frame may 
highlight certain elements and downplay others.  In an ethical sensemaking context, 
when an individual is unable to identify the ethical dimensions of a situation it is called 
“ethical blindness” (Palazzo, Krings, & Hoffrage, 2012).   
Past research has explored the impact of decision frames on ethical intentions 
and behaviors (for review see Treviño et al., 2014).  In a series of studies examining 
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how sanctioning systems affect cooperative behavior, Tenbrunsel and Messick (1999) 
found that participants exposed to no sanctions for uncooperative behavior were more 
likely to use an ethical frame and were more cooperative than those who were exposed 
to weak sanctions and adopted a business frame.  In a study conducted by Kouchaki, 
Smith-Crow, Brief, and Sousa (2013), participants exposed to money primes, as 
compared to a control condition, were more likely to have a business decision frame 
which led to unethical intentions and behaviors.  Greenbaum, Mawritz, & Elssa (2012) 
found that supervisor bottom-line mentality was positively related to employee bottom-
line mentality which was positively related to social undermining.  In a study by 
Schweitzer, DeChurch, & Gibson (2005) which also measured decision frames, 
participants with a win-oriented conflict frame, as compared to individuals with a 
cooperative conflict frame, were more likely to use deception in a negotiation task. 
Molinsky, Grant, & Margolis (2012) primed participants with an economic decision 
frame and those primed participants were less compassionate to others in need 
compared to a control condition.  Kern and Chugh (2009) found participants presented 
with a loss frame engaged in more unethical behavior than participants presented with a 
gain frame.   In a study examining the influence of reading stories of leadership on 
ethical decision making performance, participants who read personalized leader stories 
and were exposed to an ethical salience probe identified more ethical issues, compared 
with participants who read personalized leader stories with no salience probe (Watts, 
Ness, & Steele, under review).   
In the current study, we propose that inducing an ethical decision frame will 
affect sensemaking by helping participant to define the scenario in ethical terms and use 
 
8 
ethical sensemaking processes.  This will potentially result in better ethical decisions.  
When faced with an ethical dilemma, individuals able to identify the situation as moral 
or ethical in nature see an increased moral salience of the situation (Jones, 1991).  
Individuals who view the situation as involving an ethical issue will be able to identify 
more critical causes of the ethical dilemma and analyze the impact of those causes on 
the situation.  Individuals with an ethical decision frame will also look for constraints 
that could hinder their decision making process and will analyze the impact of those 
constraints.  Additionally, individuals using an ethical decision frame are more likely to 
identify positive, negative, long-term, and short-term consequences, resulting in better 
forecasts.  By using an ethical frame to organize all elements on the situation, 
individuals will make more ethical decisions. Thus we propose: 
H1: Framing an organizational problem as an ethical dilemma, versus as a 
neutral problem to be solved, will (a) increase the use of sensemaking processes 
and (b) result in more ethical decisions. 
Emotions and Ethical Sensemaking 
Emotions are inherently intertwined with any decision making process (Frijda, 
1986; Lazarus 1991; Pfister & Böhm, 2008). This includes ethical sensemaking because 
what an individual deems relevant to their mental model construction of the situation is 
guided by their emotions, personal history, and motives (Pfister & Böhm, 2008).  It is 
especially important to study specific emotions because appraisal theories of emotion 
assert that once a specific emotion is activated, the appraisal dimension or tendency of 
that emotion will influence subsequent judgement and decision making (Lerner & 
Keltner 2000; 2001; Vitell et al., 2013). 
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Cognitive appraisal theory is the foundation for the appraisal tendency 
framework. This framework suggests that different emotions are associated with 
different patterns of situational appraisals.  Primary appraisal of emotion is the 
evaluation of whether an event has occurred that is relevant to an individuals’ goals and 
well-being.  If the event is goal relevant, positive events will evoke positively valent 
emotions and negative events will evoke negative emotions. Next, secondary appraisal 
occurs related to an individuals evaluation of coping options (Barsade & Gibson, 2007).  
A specific emotion is evoked based on the selection of a combination of several 
dimensions such as perceived control, certainty, and agency in the situation (Frijda, 
1986; Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 1996; Smith & Ellsworth; 1985).  
Anger and guilt are both negative emotions which are evoked due to goal 
incongruence in the primary appraisal (Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 1996). Anger and guilt 
also share similarities in controllability and certainty.  Controllability is whether an 
individual perceives she can control, change, or modify aspects of the situation (Frijda, 
1986; Roseman, 1996). Anger and guilt both occur because an individual believes she 
has some degree of control over the situation (Frijda, 1986; Tangney, 1995).  Certainty 
is whether the outcomes of an event are known with full probability, and the emotions 
of anger and guilt share a similar level of certainty (Frijda, 1986; Roseman, Spindel, & 
Jose, 1990).  Anger and guilt differ in the dimension of agency. Agency is the whether 
the cause of the event is by circumstances beyond anyone’s control, by some other 
person, or by the self.  Events caused by some other person elicits anger, whereas, 
events caused by the self elicits guilt (Frijda, 1986; Roseman, 1996; Smith & Ellsworth, 
1985). Using a procedural priming method, Neumann (2000) confirmed that 
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participants exposed to neutral events with internal attribution were more likely to 
experience guilt and participants exposed to neutral events with external attribution 
were more likely to experience anger. 
Anger.  The emotion of anger and its relation to ethics has been studied for 
centuries.  Aristotle (1953) stated in his book “Nichomachean ethics” that anger evokes 
a desire for revenge.  Modern psychologists would agree with Aristotle, as the action 
tendency associated with anger is to attack the agent deemed to be the causes of an 
offense (Averill, 2012).  In fact, what differentiates anger from other negative emotional 
states is (a) harm or loss is blamed on another agency, (b) a belief that the agent had 
control over the situation and could have acted differently, and (c) a goal is blocked 
(Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991).  Within work contexts, anger is caused by acts of 
colleagues, management, or customers (Basch & Fisher, 1998).  
Lench et al. (2011) conducted a meta-analysis and found that anger, compared to 
neutral emotion, influences cognition, judgement, experience, and behavior with 
moderate effect sizes.  Ethical sensemaking processes could be affected in a number of 
ways.  Anger arises when a person is unable to meet their goals and she blames 
someone (or something) as causing the problem (Van Kleef, 2010).  This may limit 
what a person views are possible causes to the situation since anger arises from the 
perception of a specific agent causing the issue.  Anger may also influence what 
constraints an individual views as relevant to the situation.  Past research examining the 
impact of anger on ethical sensemaking processes found a trending main effect where 
anger evocations lead to identification of less-critical constraints than those in the 
control condition (Johnson, 2015).  Anger induces a desire to bring about change so the 
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blocked goal is attainable and attack is seen as a viable option to restore the goal 
(Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Lazarus, 1991).  Forecasting may be limited by that desire 
to attack the source of the goal blockage.  Johnson (2015) found that participants in a 
neutral condition engaged in longer-term forecasts than those in the anger condition. 
In ethical situations, anger may be caused by moral indignation where public 
good is endangered (Pfister & Böhm, 2008).  In two fields studies, Antonetti and 
Maklan (2016) extended a model of moral outrage and found support that the 
experience of anger is linked to appraisals of unfairness.  Grežo and Pilărik (2013) 
found that anger induced participant chose harsher punishments and considered those 
punishments to be more morally correct than participants in the neutral condition.  
Individuals who believe something to be unfair may be fueled by their anger to achieve 
retribution, especially when the situation is ethical in nature.  
The desire for retribution fueled by anger leading to lower ethical decisions 
making is evidenced by past research. Using ethical scenarios that induced specific 
emotions, Krishmakumar and Rymph (2012) found that increased levels of anger 
decreased ethical decision making.  Kligyte et al. (2013) found that anger induced 
participants scored lower on an ethical decision making measure than those in a control 
condition. Johnson (2015) induced anger and guilt using an ethical scenario and found 
that those in the anger evoked condition were the lowest in ethical decision making 
compared to both the guilt condition and a control condition. Thus we propose: 
H2: State anger stemming from an ethical problem will lead to (a) less use of 
sensemaking processes and (b) result in lower ethical decision making than a 
neutral emotional state. 
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Guilt.  Guilt is like anger such that an agent is blamed, however, that agent is 
specified as the ego, or one’s self (Frijda, 1986).  Guilt involves a sense of tension, 
remorse, and regret over a situation and knowing one has to deal with the situation but 
not wanting to face the situation (Frijda, 1986; Tangney, 1995). With guilt, an 
individual focuses on a specific behavior and is concerned about the effects of that 
behavior on others (Tangney, 1995). As such, the action tendency associated with guilt 
is to confess, apologize, or make reparations for the outcomes of the behavior (Lazarus, 
1991; Tangney, 1995).  
The sensemaking processes could be affected by guilt in a number of ways.  The 
core relational theme associated with guilt is “having transgressed a moral imperative” 
(Lazarus, 1991 p. 240).  As guilt is a self-focused emotion,  an individual experiencing 
guilt wants to quickly fix the problem and move on.  Dwelling on the causes and 
constraints, and forecasting potential solutions would force the individual to continue to 
feel guilty.  Individuals do not want to stay in a guilt state for an extended period of 
time (Haidt, 2001; Tangney & Dearing, 2002).  In fact, Johnson (2015) found that 
individuals in a neutral emotion condition engaged in longer term forecasts than those 
in a guilt evoked condition. 
Guilt is one of the moral emotions and arises from “internalized values about 
right and wrong” (Lazarus 1991, p. 240).  Cohen (2010) found that guilt-proneness 
significantly predicted disapproval of false promises, misrepresentations, lying during 
negotiations, and making promises not intended to be kept.  Agnihotri et al. (2012) 
build on Gaudine and Thorne’s (2001) cognitive-affective model and found that 
salesperson guilt-proneness positively influence ethical attitudes which in turn 
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influenced ethical decision making.  However, Johnson  (2015) found that participants 
in the guilt condition did not significantly differ from those in the neutral emotion 
condition in decision ethicality.  Thus we propose: 
H3: State guilt stemming from an ethical problem will lead to less use of 
sensemaking processes. 
 As previously discussed, guilt and anger share many appraisal dimensions but 
differ in terms of agency.  Those who experience guilt believe the self is the reason for 
goal blockage and those who experience anger believe another agency is responsible for 
goal blockage (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). This difference could result in differences 
between guilt and anger in the use of sensemaking processes and decision ethicality. 
Past research by Johnson (2015) demonstrated that anger, compared to guilt, led 
individuals to identify more causes of the situation. Perhaps, because those experiencing 
guilt want to make reparations and move on from the problem, whereas, those 
experiencing anger want to bring about change in order to attain the blocked goal, those 
experiencing anger will engage in more sensemaking processes than those experiencing 
guilt.  Angry individuals may also engage in sensemaking to justify and/or plan 
retaliatory actions.  Johnson found that those in an anger evoked condition had more 
retaliatory cognitions and behavior than those in a guilt condition.  Similarly, Kligyte et 
al. (2013) found that those in an anger induced condition, compared to both a fear and a 
control condition, engaged in greater retaliation and less helping behaviors.  The desire 
for retaliation, versus reparation, would require more planning and thus more use of 
sensemaking processes.  The use of sensemaking processes by angry individuals does 
not necessarily mean that those who are angry will have higher decision ethicality.  In 
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fact, Johnson found that participants in an anger evoked condition made less ethical 
decisions than those in the guilt condition.  Thus we propose:  
H4:  State guilt stemming from an ethical problem will lead to (a) less use of 
sensemaking processes than an angry emotional state but (b) result in more 
ethical decisions than an angry emotional state. 
Confirmation Bias 
 When an individual is faced with an ethical dilemma new information may come 
to light or more information will be sought to help the person build a mental model of 
the situation (Mumford et al., 2008).  The new information can change how issues or 
situations are conceptualized and how relevant (or not) the new information is for 
understanding and addressing the ethical problem (Choo, 2006).  Within an ethical 
dilemma, it is common for new information to become available. Some of that new 
information will be consistent with previous or known information about the situation 
and some of it may conflict.   
 Confirmation bias occurs when an individual prefers or gives more attention or 
weight to information that is consistent with their previous understanding of the 
situation over information that conflicts with previous information (Jonas & Frey, 2003; 
Jonas, Graupmann, & Frey, 2006; Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, & Frey, 2005; Jonas, Schulz-
Hardt, Frey, & Thelen, 2001; Jonas, Traut-Mattausch, Frey, & Greenberg, 2008).  A 
large body of literature indicates that individuals prefer information that supports their 
understanding of an event, however the concept goes by several different names.  The 
tendency to be selective of information is referred to in the literature as selective 
exposure to information (e.g. Festinger, 1957; Frey, 1986), congeniality bias (e.g. Eagly 
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& Chaiken 1993; 2005), and confirmation bias (e.g. Jonas et al., 2001).  For the purpose 
of this paper, the process of attending to and using information that supports initial 
information provided about the situation and not using information that conflicts with 
the initial information presented will be called confirmation bias. 
Confirmation bias originates from the concept of the availability heuristic.  
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) describe the availability heuristic as an occasion when 
an individual assess the probability of an event by how easily one can recall similar 
instances or occurrences.  One of the four categories of biases that lead to the 
availability heuristic are “biases due to the irretrievability of instances.”  Tversky and 
Kahneman state that an event is more easily retrievable when it is familiar or especially 
salient to an individual.  For example, Tversky and Kahneman conducted a study in 
which participants were given a list with an equal number of male and female famous 
people. Participants recalled the list as having more males or females based on which 
group (male or female) was relatively more famous.  One specific form of the 
availability heuristic is the illusory correlation which is the bias in the judgement of the 
frequency with which two events co-occur. The illusory correlation effect is very 
resistant to contradictory information (Chapman & Chapman, 1969). 
Hammond et al. (1998) explains that there are two psychological forces behind 
confirmation bias.  First, individuals have a tendency to subconsciously decide what 
they want to do before they decide why they want to do it.  Second, individuals have an 
inclination to be more engaged with things they like than things they dislike, known as 
dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957; Frey, 1986).  Dissonance theory asserts that when 
engaged in decision making individuals experience an averse motivational state due to 
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needing to deal with the disadvantages of the chosen option and not having the 
advantages of the option not chosen.  Cognitive dissonance can be reduced by 
preferring supporting information and avoiding disconfirming information, otherwise 
known as confirmation bias (Frey, 1986). 
Past research has found that inconsistent information is ok if there is a very 
small amount of information to consider (Freedman, 1965; Freedman & Sears, 1965; 
Sears, 1965).  More information makes it more difficult for individuals to process and 
so they resort to shortcuts and go with familiar information (Fischer, Schulz-Hardt, and 
Frey, 2008).  In the real world, we are very seldom only given two pieces of 
information thus this study used ten pieces of information to examine confirmation bias. 
Confirmation bias and ethical sensemaking. The ethical sensemaking process 
could be impacted by confirmation bias.  Messick and Bazerman (1996) explored 
several theories executives use to make judgments and guide decisions. They provided 
advice for executives to improve their ethical decision making by increasing the quality 
of their decisions through creating accurate assessments of risk. Rogerson et al. (2011) 
in their discussion of non-rational processes in ethical decision making assert that 
confirmation bias can and will affect ethical decision making.  There are few studies 
that explicitly explore confirmation bias and ethical decision making.  Medeiros et al. 
(2014) identified a taxonomy of biases operating in the ethical decision making of 
university faculty. They described willful ignorance as “ignorance of outcomes of 
information that would cause one to move backwards, abandon current plans, or to face 
negative consequences.” (p. 226).  Ehrich and Irwin (2005) demonstrated how 
consumers engage in willful ignorance with ethical issues. Consumers requested ethical 
 
17 
attribute information about products at a lower rate than they would have used the 
information if it were easily available.  
The use of information that conforms to an individuals’ existing understanding 
of the situation provides limited use above what the individual already knows.  New 
information that is consistent with existing information will strengthen an individual’s 
belief that the information is accurate but does not extend the mental model 
construction.  When an individual is faced with an ethical dilemma, the more 
information they have about the situation can impact the sensemaking processes. With 
additional information, an individual can identify more potential causes and constraints. 
The additional information can also help the individual to create higher quality and 
more forecasts of possible outcomes. This higher engagement in the sensemaking 
process will allow an individual to more fully understand the ethical dilemma at hand 
and with that greater understanding, they will be able to make better ethical decisions.  
Thus we propose: 
H5: Individuals who use conflicting information when solving the ethical 
dilemma will have (a) increased use of sensemaking processes and (b) more 
ethical decisions. 
Confirmation bias may explain why certain emotions and framing exert 
influence on sensemaking and decision ethicality.  In order for additional information to 
be incorporated into a person’s understanding of the situation sensemaking is required. 
As individuals have more information to consider, they may resort to using information 
that is familiar and seek out information that confirms their existing understanding of 
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the situation.  The mediational effects of confirmation bias on ethical framing and 
sensemaking, and  emotional states on sensemaking are further discussed. 
 Confirmation bias and framing. Confirmation bias may be affected by the 
type of framing used in the ethical sensemaking process. Kastenműller, Greitemeyer, 
Jonas, Fischer, and Frey (2010) found that when individuals were asked to frame their 
information search in terms of gains (selecting from a list which articles they would like 
to read) versus loss (selecting from a list which articles they do NOT want to read) 
participants sought more conflicting information in the loss condition. In a study 
conducted by Jonas, Traut-Mattausch, Frey, and Greenberg (2008) participants told to 
focus on the decision increased confirmation bias whereas participants told to focus on 
the available pieces of information decreased confirmation bias.  The evidence suggests 
that how the problem is framed can affect confirmation bias. 
When the situation is framed as an ethical dilemma, individuals know it is a high 
stakes situation in which others could be affected. Framing a situation as ethical, cues a 
person to think beyond the effects on the self and to consider how others may be 
affected.  Jonas et al., (2005) found that participants who were asked to act as advisors 
used both confirming and disconfirming information to make a decision however, they 
still had a preference for confirming information. Jonas and Frey (2003) found 
participants who played the role as a friend giving advice presented both confirming 
and disconfirming evidence and participants who played the role of a travel agent 
presented more information that supported their decision. Ethical dilemmas can increase 
the salience of how other individuals will be affected thus individuals may be more 
inclined to use conflicting information when faced with an ethical dilemma.   
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Framing could affect whether a person is open to looking for additional 
information.  When a problem is framed as an ethical problem, an individual may be 
more open to look for additional information, especially conflicting information.  
Ethical framing may lead to individuals to seek out conflicting information because the 
moral salience and stakes are higher, motivating a more careful consideration of 
information (Jones, 1991).  The individual will incorporate the conflicting information 
into their understanding of the situation and may identify additional causes, constraints, 
and potential forecasts.  Also, those who use conflicting information will be able to use 
the additional information to make a more informed decision.  Alternatively, 
participants in the neutral condition will use the confirming information but not the 
conflicting information.  The ethical salience of the situation is not high for those in the 
neutral condition and they may be more inclined to take a “mental shortcut” and just use 
information that conforms with their existing understanding of the information.  Hence: 
H6: Confirmation bias will mediate the relationship between ethical framing and 
sensemaking processes and decision ethicality, such that those who see a 
problem framed ethically will use conflicting information and thus will use more 
sensemaking processes as compared to those who see a problem framed 
neutrally will use confirming information and will use less sensemaking process. 
H7: Confirmation bias will mediate the relationship between ethical framing and 
decision ethicality, such that those who see a problem framed ethically will use 
conflicting information and thus will have higher decision ethicality compared 
to those who see a problem framed neutrally, who will use confirming 
information and have lower decision ethicality. 
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Confirmation bias and emotions. The emotional state of an individual may 
also influence the use of confirming or conflicting information. Ehrich and Irwin 
(2005), found that consumers avoid feeling sad or angry over labor practices by not 
requesting ethical attribute information for products even though the consumers indicate 
that they would have used the information if it were easily available.  Similarly, Jonas et 
al., (2006) found that induced negative mood increase the preference for consistent 
information. Thus: 
H8: Confirmation bias will mediate the relationship between state emotion and 
the  sensemaking processes and decision ethicality such that, those with neutral 
emotion stemming from the problem will use conflicting information and 
confirming information more than those in the state anger and state guilt 
conditions and thus will (a) use more sensemaking processes and (b) have higher 
decision ethicality.  
There may be differences between anger and guilt in use of confirming and 
conflicting information.  The self versus other agency appraisal dimension of guilt and 
anger could influence an individual’s preference for confirming information, conflicting 
information, or both.  Information preference would in turn influence the use of 
sensemaking processes and decision ethicality. Agrawal, Han, and Duhacheck (2012) 
induced specific emotions and found that participants in the preference inconsistent 
condition experiencing anger were less likely to change their minds than those 
experiencing shame or neutral emotions.  In the current study, the experienced emotion 
is relevant to the ethical dilemma and we expect to have similar results. Those 
experiencing anger are less likely to seek out information that conflicts with their initial 
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understanding of the situation and will engage in less sensemaking processes. Anger 
may lead to individuals seek out only confirming information because they feel like 
they fully understand the causes of the situation and have a desire for retribution (Frijda, 
1986; Johnson 2015; Kligyte et al., 2013; Roseman, 1996; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).  
Individuals who feel guilty may look for conflicting information because it gives them a 
reason to no longer feel guilty for “causing” the situation.  Those who experience guilt 
will want to resolve their anguish and will look to solve the issue.  Thus we propose the 
following mediational hypotheses: 
H9: Confirmation bias will mediate the relationship between state emotion and 
the  sensemaking processes and decision ethicality such that, those with state 
guilt stemming from the problem, compared to anger, will use conflicting 
information more and thus will (a) use more sensemaking processes and (b) 
have higher decision ethicality. 
 H10: Confirmation bias will mediate the relationship between state emotion and 
the  sensemaking processes and decision ethicality such that, those with state 
anger stemming from the problem, compared to guilt, will use confirming 
information more and (c) will use less sensemaking process and (d) have lower 
decision ethicality. 
Method 
Sample and Design 
After approval from a large south central university’s Institutional Review 
Board, participants were recruited from the psychology department’s human participant 
pool, which contains undergrads from a wide variety of majors. Participants were 
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recruited using an online resource (SONA systems) where students could view brief 
descriptions of studies in which they could voluntarily participate for course credit. 
There were 224 participants, 70 men and 153 women (one did not disclose), with an 
average age of 18.7, SD = 1.74. Participants had an average of 2.43, SD = 2.28 years of 
work experience and a majority of participants indicated English was their first 
language (92%). 
A 3 (emotion evocation of anger, guilt, or neutral) x 2 (ethical probe or neutral) 
between-subjects design was utilized to investigate the proposed hypotheses. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the six conditions. Confirmation bias was 
assessed through two measured variables. 
Procedure 
The general procedure consisted of four steps. First, after completing an 
informed consent form, participants complete a series of covariates included the timed 
Wonderlic Personnel Test. Participants were then asked to take on the role of a 
marketing research analyst and were given information regarding their job with the 
organization, the organization’s background, and a description of their relationship with 
a coworker and a manager (See Appendix A).  Next, participants were presented with a 
challenging organizational situation with ethical implications, including an email from a 
coworker that relayed the need to complete a task.  Participants also read an explicit 
statement framing the situation as either ethical or neutral framing.  Then, participants 
were given ten statements revealing new information about the case.  Order of 
statements were randomized for each participant. Immediately following the new case 
information, participants were asked a series of questions. The questions asked 
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participants to describe (a) the problem, (b) causes of the problem, (c) key factors and 
challenges of the problem, (d) what should be considered when solving the problem, (e) 
possible outcomes, (f) their decision and next steps, and (g) the reasoning behind their 
decision (Mumford et al., 2006; 2008). Then participants completed a number of 
manipulation checks specific to emotion evocation (e.g., guilt and anger) and ethical 
framing. Lastly, participants completed additional covariate measures. 
Manipulations 
Emotion evocation. The emotion evocation manipulation (anger, guilt, or 
neutral) was embedded in the case in which participants were asked to play a role. This 
case was modified from a case used in past studies on ethical decision making (e.g., 
Bagdasarov et al., 2015; Johnson 2015). The participant is asked to assume the role of 
as a member of a market research group at an organization named Innovation Marketing 
Inc., and a mistake is caught regarding research done for a hybrid car ad campaign. 
After the mistake is caught, the participant receives an email from a coworker with a 
reminder to complete the final report for the project.  
With all other content being held constant, the source and potential outcomes of 
the mistake were manipulated to reflect the underlying appraisal patterns of guilt and 
anger. The first step (i.e., the primary appraisal) for inducing negative valence emotions 
is personal goal incongruence (Lazarus, 1991). Thus, for both anger and guilt 
conditions, the email from the coworker emphasized the large-stakes nature and 
potential consequences of not completing the project report such as someone losing 
their job. The neutral emotion group read a general email about the need to complete the 
project report by the deadline. 
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The secondary appraisal of self- or other-blame or responsibility was 
manipulated to specifically generate the negative emotions of either anger of guilt 
(Lazarus, 1991; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). In the anger condition, the mistake was 
made by a coworker and could result in the participant losing his/her job. In the guilt 
condition, the mistake was the participants’ fault and could cause a coworker to lose his 
job. The secondary appraisal of controllability was held constant by the mistake being 
committed by a person (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). A statement following the scenario 
emphasized these secondary appraisals by underscoring the mistake and the 
consequences. For the neutral emotion condition, there was no specific source 
mentioned and the scenario referenced the work group, which created more of a vague 
source of error and controllability (See Appendix B for cases with manipulation 
details). 
Manipulation check. Success of the emotion evocation manipulations was 
assessed via self-reported levels of anger and guilt, ratings of anger and guilt within the 
open-ended responses (rating procedures explained in next section), and a modified 
version of Roseman’s (1996) self- versus other- control and responsibility measure. 
After completing the scenario questions, participants reported levels of anger and guilt 
using a 5-point Likert scale of current experience (1 = very slightly/not at all and 5 = 
extremely). The adjectives angry, irritated, irate, and mad assessed anger (Nabi, 2003).  
Guilt was assessed using the adjectives guilty, regret, remorse, self-conscious, and 
humiliated (Harder & Salma, 1990). The Cronbach’s alphas for anger and guilt were .74 
and .87, respectfully. 
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Raters identified the levels of anger (r*WG = .71; ICC[2] = .74)  and guilt (r*WG = 
.65; ICC[2] = .85) in responses to the ethical scenario. Raters assessed the participant 
seemed angry and guilty in their responses using 5-point Likert scales (anger, 1 = 
participant does not appear angry or defensive regarding the act and 5 = participant 
appears very angry about the event and is defensive regarding the event; guilt, 1 = 
participant does not appear to evaluate behavior or feel any remorse regarding their 
behavior and 5 = participant highly evaluates their behavior and feels a high level of 
remorse regarding their behavior). 
The underlying appraisals of the emotions were assessed using seven items 
modified from Roseman’s (1996) of self- versus other- control and responsibility 
measure.  After self-reporting levels of anger and guilt, participants responded to six 9-
point semantic differential scales asking participants to identify the cause of their 
emotional reaction. Items include “Thinking that I was not at all responsible for leaving 
the technical specification off of the list” to “Thinking that I was very much responsible 
for leaving the technical specifications off of the list” and “ Thinking that circumstances 
leading to leaving the technical specification off of the list was not at all caused by 
someone else” to “ Thinking that leaving the technical specifications off of the list was 
very much caused by someone else”. Roseman (1996) provided evidence for construct 
validity of the self- versus other- control and responsibility measure. The Cronbach’s 
alphas for self- and other- control and responsibility were .85 and .64, respectfully. 
Ethical frame. The ethical framing manipulation was embedded in the case 
content (See Appendix C for framing manipulations).  After reading the case 
background information, the ethical dilemma, and the emails, participants were told that 
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the mistakes may have “ethical implications for the project” in the ethical framing 
condition or the mistake may have “implications for the project” in the neutral framing 
condition.   
The ethical framing manipulation was assessed by self-report and open ended 
ratings. After responding to the open ended questions about the scenario, participants 
reported the extent to which they believed the issue was an (a) ethical and (b) moral 
problem using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = disagree strongly and 5 = agree strongly). 
Raters assessed ethical framing (r*WG = .75; ICC[2] = .87) via the open-ended responses 
by rating the degree to which the participant identified the problem as ethical in nature 
using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = very poor problem ethicality recognition and 5 = very 
strong problem ethicality recognition). 
Confirmation bias.  Confirmation bias has been examined in a number of 
different ways in the literature including ratings for preference of information (Brannon, 
Tagler, & Eagly, 2007; Feather 1963), rank order of degree of interest (Brock, 1965), 
amount of time devoted to viewing information (Brock & Balloun, 1967; Olson & 
Zanna, 1979), and selection of information for further review (Frey & Wicklund, 1978).  
Confirmation bias has yet to be examined within the ethical sensemaking framework.  
For this study, participants were shown ten pieces of additional information about the 
case after receiving information about the scenario and ethical dilemma but before 
asking to solve the problem (See Appendix D for the statements). Five pieces of 
information were consistent with initial case information and five pieces of information 
conflicted with initial information. For each of the ten pieces of information, raters 
assessed the extent to which the participant used the piece of information in their 
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decision making process using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = did not mention statement at 
all and 5 = explicitly mentioned statement and extensively used in the decision making 
process).  The ratings of the five confirming pieces of information were summed to 
create the use of confirming statements variable (r*WG = .88; ICC[2] = .65) and the 
ratings for the five conflicting pieces of information were summed to create the use of 
conflicting statements variable (r*WG = .81; ICC[2] = .64).  Higher scores on the use of 
confirming statements potentially indicates more confirmation bias, while higher scores 
on use of conflicting information potentially indicates less confirmation bias, or, 
alternatively openness to new conflicting information. 
Rating Procedures 
 Three Industrial Organizational Psychology graduate students served as raters 
for the dependent variables in this study. These raters were blind to the conditions 
associated with all responses. Prior to rating, all raters participated in frame of reference 
training (Bernardin & Buckley, 1981). During this training program, raters were 
familiarized with the rating scales, operational definitions of each scale, and 
benchmarks of the scales. Raters practiced applying these rating scales to a set of 
sample responses. Meetings were held to discuss their ratings and resolve any 
discrepancies. The raters independently rated participant’s responses to the ethical 
decision making questions, meeting occasionally to help avoid rater drift. 
Following the completion of all ratings, interrater agreement and reliability 
estimates were calculated for all variables rated by judges. To assess the 
appropriateness of aggregating scores across judges the r*WG index (James, Demaree, & 
Wolf, 1984) and the mixed effects, two-way ANOVA intraclass correlation coefficient 
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(ICC[2]; Bliese, 2000) were calculated. The r*WG index and intraclass correlation 
coefficient are complementary statistics that assess the magnitude of rating similarity 
among judges (Biemann, Cole, & Voelpel, 2012). The guidelines where any estimate 
above .70 is considered acceptable were used as discussed by LeBreton and Senter’s 
(2008). Most of the r*WG and ICC[2] estimates were above .70, justifying the 
aggregation (i.e., averaging) of judges’ scores for the dependent variables.  
Dependent Variables 
The seven questions following each scenario and rating scales developed and 
validated by Mumford et al. (2006) aim at tapping into the sensemaking processes used 
in ethical sensemaking to elicit a decision from participants.  Mumford et al. provided 
evidence that these variables are reliable markers of successful ethical sensemaking (see 
also Mumford et al., 2008). 
Causal analysis.  Causal analysis consists of three variables; problem 
recognition, number of causes identified, and cause criticality.  Problem recognition 
(r*WG = .76; ICC[2] = .78) was defined as the extent to which the participant identified 
the critical aspects of the ethical dilemma. Raters coded problem recognition using a 5-
point Likert scale (1 = very poor problem recognition and 5 = very strong problem 
recognition). Number of causes (r*WG = .56; ICC[2] = .78)  was a count of the number 
of distinct causes identified.  Cause criticality (r*WG = .70; ICC[2] = .59)  was defined as 
the importance or relevance of the identified causes to the ethical dilemma.  Raters 
evaluated the extent to which the identified causes related to the ethical dilemma and 
the extent to which the identified causes caused the ethical dilemma using a 5-point 
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Likert scale (1 = none to very little criticality in causes identified and 5 = extensive 
criticality in causes identified).   
Constraint analysis.  Raters coded for breadth of constraints and criticality of 
constraints. Breadth of constraints (r*WG = .84; ICC[2] = .86) was defined as the extent 
to which the constraints cover a large number of factors (personal and situational) and 
elements (people, tasks, groups, etc.), and was rated on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = very 
narrow and 5 = very broad).  Criticality of constraints (r*WG = .81; ICC[2] = .71) was 
defined as the importance or relevance of the constraints identified to the ethical 
dilemma, and was also rated on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = none to very little criticality 
in constraints identified and 5 = extensive criticality in constraints identified).  
Forecasting. Raters coded for short-term timeframe, long-term timeframe, 
positivity, negativity, and quality of forecasted outcomes.  Short-term timeframe (r*WG 
= .73; ICC[2] = .38)  was defined as the extent to which the response focused on the 
short-term and was rated on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = not at all short-term and 5 = 
highly short-term).  Long-term timeframe (r*WG = .76; ICC[2] = .54)  was assessed 
using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = not at all long-term and 5 = highly long-term) and was 
defined as the extent to which the response focused on the long-term. Raters assessed 
positivity(r*WG = .86; ICC[2] = .89) by determining the extent to which the outcomes 
mentioned were positive (1 = no positivity and 5 = very positive). Negativity (r*WG = 
.81; ICC[2] = .86) was defined as the extent to which the outcomes mentioned were 
negative and was rated on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = no negativity and 5 = very 
negative). Quality of forecasted outcomes(r*WG = .86; ICC[2] = .83) was defined as the 
extent to which the forecasted outcomes displayed detail, relevance to the scenario, 
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consider critical aspects of the scenario, and are realistic. Raters assessed quality on a 5-
point Likert scale (1 = poor quality and 5 = very good quality). 
Decision ethicality.  Decision ethicality was determined by averaging the 
ratings of the three dimensions of ethicality of regard for welfare of others, attending to 
personal responsibilities, and adherence to and awareness of social obligations. Regard 
for welfare of others (r*WG = .69; ICC[2] = .78) was defined as the extent to which the 
decision reflected attention and care for the welfare of others (Forsyth, 1980; Kish-
Gephart, Harrison, & Treviño, 2010). Responses low in the consideration of the welfare 
of others could include intentionally harming others or manipulating others for selfish 
gain. Responses high in the consideration of the welfare of others could include 
intentionally working to benefit others or behaving for the benefit of others at one’s 
personal expense. Regard for welfare of others was assessed using a 5-point Likert scale 
(1 = very low regard of welfare of others and 5 = very high regard for welfare of 
others). Attending to personal responsibilities (r*WG = .85; ICC[2] = .80) was defined as 
the extent to which the decision reflected attention to one’s personal responsibilities 
(Trevino, 1986). Negligence, failing to take action, avoiding responsibility, and doing 
the minimum are all markers of low personal responsibility. Markers of high personal 
responsibility included actively avoiding personal bias, seeking additional information 
to clarify the situation, and being accountable to one’s actions, behaviors, and 
outcomes. Attending to personal responsibilities was assessed using a 5-point Likert 
scale (1 = very low attending to personal responsibilities and 5 = very high attending to 
personal responsibilities). Adherence to and awareness of social obligations (r*WG = 
.57; ICC[2] = .67) was defined as the extent to which the decision reflected the 
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adherence to social obligations, whether the group, organization, field, or society at 
large (Trevino, 1986). Markers of high adherence to social obligations included 
consideration and/or knowledge of guidelines, awareness and respect of cultural norms 
and values, attending one’s duties of their given social role, and the awareness and 
consideration of the formal and informal norms the typically guide behavior. Low 
adherence to and awareness of social obligations was the lack of high adherence to and 
awareness of social obligations or outright disregard for social obligations.  Adherence 
to and awareness of social obligations was assessed using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = 
very low adherence to and awareness of social obligations and 5 = very high adherence 
to and awareness of social obligations). 
Control Variables 
A number of controls were used in this study in accordance with methods 
described by Bernerth and Aguinis (2016). Controls were included in the analyses if (a) 
there was a theoretical rationale for including the control; (b) the relationship between 
the control and variables in this study are empirically established; and (c) can the 
control be measured reliably.  Theoretical and empirical evidence are briefly described 
below, as well as, description of how the control was measured reliably.   
There are several reasons why it is important to include controls in the final 
analyses.  First, random assignment does help to deal with the influences of extraneous 
influences by equalizing their influence across conditions by making means more 
similar.  However, in order to look at the unique influence of what we are manipulating 
(e.g., emotion evocation of anger and guilt) beyond the influence of controls (e.g., 
narcissism) known to influence the DV (e.g., decision ethicality) these controls should 
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be included.  This results in more precise results by reducing the standard error and 
increasing power to detect effects.  Second, random assignment is sometimes less than 
perfect with relatively small sample sizes and will sometimes results in imbalances in 
controls across conditions.  Due to these reasons, along with the theoretical and 
empirical evidence provided below, controls were included in the initial analyses.  If the 
control was not significant, it was taken out of the analysis.  Final controls for each 
analysis are described in the results section. 
Intelligence. Ethical decision making is a cognitively demanding activity thus 
intelligence was assessed as a control measure (Martin, Bagdasarov, & Connelly, 2015).  
The Wonderlic Personnel Test (WPT) was used to examine participant problem-solving 
ability (Wonderlic, 1983). Participants were given twelve minutes to answer as many 
questions as they could of the fifty questions that increased in difficulty.  Dodrill (1981) 
provides evidence for construct validity of the WPT. The Cronbach’s alpha reliability 
was .72. 
Trait emotions. Some individuals have a tendency to experience guilt or anger 
more than others (Tangney, 1995).  Therefore, it is important to assess the likelihood of 
experiencing guilt or anger. Guilt-proneness was assessed using the 16-item Test of 
Self-Conscious Affect – Version 3 (TOSCA-3; Tangney, Dearing, Wagner, & 
Gramzow, 2000), where participants rated reactions to scenarios on a 5-point Likert 
scale (1 = not likely and 5 = very likely).  Anger-proneness was assessed using a 
similarly structured measure (Anger Response Inventory; Tangney, Wagner, Marschall, 
& Gramzow, 1999). Tangney (1995) provided evidence for construct validity of the 
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TOSCA-3 and Tangney et al. (1996) for the Anger Response Inventory.  The 
Cronbach’s alpha reliability for guilt-and anger-proneness was .72 and .81, respectively. 
Need for structure. Need for structure is an individual difference for the desire 
for simple structure in order to understand the world. Individuals with a high need for 
structure will organize information in less complex ways and thus may be more likely to 
engaged in confirmation bias (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993; Jonas et al., 2001). Need for 
structure was assessed using Thompson, Naccarato, & Parker’s (1989) Personal Need 
for Structure Scale.  Participants indicated their agreement on a 6-point Likert scale (1 =  
strongly disagree and 6 = strongly agree) to eleven statements.  Items include “I don’t 
like situations that are uncertain” and “I find that a consistent routine enables me to 
enjoy life more.” Neuberg and Newsom (1993) provided evidence for construct validity 
of the Personal Need for Structure Scale. The Cronbach’s alpha reliability for need for 
structure was .81. 
Narcissism. Narcissism is an individual difference involving a fragile but 
grandiose sense of self and entitlement and is negatively related to ethical decision 
making (Mumford et al., 2008). Narcissism was assessed using the Narcissistic 
Personality Inventory (Raskin & Terry, 1988).  Participants were asked to choose the 
statement closest to their feelings for forty paired statements.  Items include “I have a 
natural talent for influencing people” versus “ I am not good at influencing people” and 
“I would do almost anything on a dare” versus “I tend to be a fairly cautious person.”  
Raskin and Terry (1988) provided evidence for construct validity of the NPI.  The 




Correlations among study variables and descriptive statistics by condition are 
presented in Tables 1-5.  All sensemaking strategies correlated with decision ethicality 
as expected based on prior research.  Use of confirming statements and use of 
conflicting statements both correlated with problem recognition, causal analysis, 
constraint analysis, and quality of forecast variables.  Use of conflicting statements also 
correlated with all of the forecasting variables.  Neither use of confirming statements 
nor use of conflicting statements was significantly correlated with overall decision 
ethicality. 
ANCOVAs were conducted to test H1-H4 and results are reported in Tables 6 
and 7. Post-hoc mean comparison tests were conducted using the Bonferroni post-hoc 
criterion. Hierarchical least squares regressions were used to test H5 and are reported in 
Tables 8, 9, and 10.  H6-H10 were tested using PROCESS for SPSS from Hayes (2013) 
employing 10,000 bootstrapped resamples. Unique models were conducted for each 
sensemaking process and decision ethicality.  The control variables of intelligence, 
guilt-proneness, anger-proneness, need for structure, and narcissism were included in all 
analyses. Because the emotion evocation condition is a multicategorical independent 
variable, first the neutral then the guilt condition were set as the reference group. 
Mediational effects are significant when the indirect effect’s 95 percent confidence 
interval (CI.95) does not include zero (see Table 11). 
Manipulation Checks 
 Emotion evocation. All manipulation checks (i.e. self-reported levels of guilt 
and anger, open-ended ratings, and self- versus other- control and responsibility 
measure) for emotion evocation were successful.  An analysis of variance showed that 
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those in the anger condition (M = 3.01, SD = 0.13) experienced higher levels of self-
reported anger than those in the guilt condition (M = 2.16, SD = 0.13), p ≤ .001 and 
those in the neutral condition (M = 2.20, SD = 0.13), p ≤ .001, F(2, 221) = 14.07, p ≤ 
.001.  Additionally those in the guilt condition (M = 3.69, SD = 0.17) experienced 
higher levels of self-reported guilt than those in the anger condition (M = 2.22, SD = 
0.17), p ≤ .001 and those in the neutral condition (M = 2.96, SD = 0.17), p ≤ .001, F(2, 
221) = 17.77, p ≤ .001.   
For the open-ended ratings,  participants in the anger condition (M = 2.25, SD = 
0.05) reflected higher levels of anger in their responses than those in the guilt condition 
(M = 1.40, SD = 0.05), p ≤ .001 and those in the neutral condition (M = 1.42, SD = 
0.05), p ≤ .001, F(2, 221) = 95.21, p ≤ .001.  An analysis of variances demonstrated that 
those in the guilt condition (M = 3.32, SD = 0.10) reflected higher levels of guilt in their 
responses than those in the anger condition (M = 1.84, SD = 0.10), p ≤ .001 and those in 
the neutral condition (M = 2.77, SD = 0.10), p ≤ .001, F(2, 221) = 52.31, p ≤ .001.   
The underlying appraisals of the emotion manipulation check was also 
successful. Participants in the anger condition (M = 6.43, SD = 0.20) perceived others 
(namely, the coworker) as more responsible than participants in the guilt condition (M = 
3.03, SD = 0.20), p ≤ .001 and those in the neutral condition (M = 4.04, SD = 0.20), p ≤ 
.001, F(2, 218) = 75.48, p ≤ .001. Individuals in the guilt condition (M = 6.80, SD = 0.2) 
perceived themselves as being more responsible for the situation than participants in the 
anger condition (M = 3.63, SD = 0.23), p ≤ .001, F(2, 218) = 53.30, p ≤ .001. 
Ethics frame. The rated manipulation check was significant, where participants 
in the ethical frame condition  (M = 3.44, SD = 0.09) identified the issue as an ethical 
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dilemma more than those in the neutral condition (M = 3.02, SD = 0.09), F(1, 222) = 
10.07, p ≤ .01. 
The self-report manipulation check asked participants the extent to which they 
believed the issue was an (a) ethical and (b) moral problem. For the extent to which 
participants believed the issue was an ethical problem, the mean in the ethical framing 
condition (M = 4.10, SD = 0.11), while higher, was not significantly different than those 
in the neutral condition (M = 3.86, SD = 0.11). Participants in the ethical frame 
condition (M = 4.13, SD = 0.11) did, however, identify the issue as a moral issue at a 
higher rate than those in the neutral condition (M = 3.64, SD = 0.12), F(2, 217) = 9.00, p 
≤ .01. 
Ethical Framing, Sensemaking Process, and Decision Ethicality 
 Hypothesis 1, proposed that framing the problem in ethical terms would (a) 
increase the use of sensemaking processes and (b) result in more ethical decisions. H1a 
was not supported and there was partial support for H1b. While framing did not lead to 
higher decision ethicality, when ethicality was examined at the subcomponent level 
(regard for welfare of others, attending to personal responsibilities, and adherence to 
and awareness of social obligations) a main effect of ethics was present for regard for 
welfare of others.  Specifically, participants in the ethical framing condition (M = 3.39, 
SD = 0.08), had a higher regard of welfare for others than those in the neutral condition 
(M = 3.09, SD = 0.08), F(1, 217) = 6.50, p ≤ .01, ηp2 = .03. 
Emotions and Sensemaking Processes 
 H2a, H3, and H4a proposed differences between anger, guilt, and neutral 
emotion evoked conditions with regard to use of sensemaking processes.  Main effects 
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were found for number of causes (controlling for intelligence), constraint criticality 
(controlling for intelligence and guilt-proneness), and short-term timeframe (no controls 
were significant).  Participants in the neutral emotion evocation condition (M = 4.65, SD 
= 0.17) identified the greatest number of causes compared to those in the anger 
condition (M = 4.01, SD = 0.17), p ≤ .05 and guilt condition (M = 3.98, SD = 0.17), p ≤ 
.01, F(2, 217) = 5.23, p ≤ .01, ηp2 = .05.  Those in the neutral condition (M = 3.83, SD = 
0.07) also identified constraints with more criticality than those in the anger condition 
(M = 3.52, SD = 0.07), p ≤ .01, F(2, 216) = 4.86, p ≤ .01, ηp2 = .04. Those in the neutral 
condition  (M = 2.71, SD = 0.06) did not consider as many short-term forecasts than 
those in the anger condition (M = 2.96, SD = 0.06), p ≤ .01 and guilt condition (M = 
3.10, SD = 0.06), p ≤ .01, F(2, 218) = 11.99, p ≤ .01, ηp2 = .10.  Overall, these results 
provide partial support for H2a because the anger evocation condition showed lower 
usage of several sensemaking processes than the neutral emotion condition.  The guilt 
evocation condition, compared to the neutral condition, also displayed lower usage of 
two of the ten sensemaking processes, providing partial support for H3.  H4a was not 
supported because no significant differences were found between the anger and guilt 
conditions for use of sensemaking processes.  
Emotion and Decision Ethicality 
 H2b proposed that state anger would result in less ethical decisions than the 
neutral condition.  H4b proposed that the guilt evocation condition would result in more 
ethical decisions than the anger condition.  An ANCOVA controlling for guilt-
proneness, found support for H2b.  Participants in the neutral emotion condition (M = 
3.29, SD = 0.06) had higher ethicality than those in the anger condition (M = 2.88, SD = 
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0.07), p ≤ .01, F(2, 217) = 22.15, p ≤ .01, ηp2 = .17.  H4b was also supported.  
Participants in the guilt condition (M = 3.48, SD = 0.07) were significantly higher in 
decision ethicality than those in the anger condition, p ≤ .01.  Participants who felt state 
guilt had the highest decision ethicality, but were not significantly different from the 
neutral condition.  
Confirmation Bias, Sensemaking Processes, and Decision Ethicality 
H5 was tested in a series of hierarchical multiple regression analyses in which 
the control variables of intelligence, guilt-proneness, anger-proneness, need for 
structure, and narcissism were entered in Step 1. The confirmation bias variables were 
entered in Step 2. The results are presented in Tables 8, 9, and 10. The results indicated 
that after controlling for intelligence, guilt-proneness, anger-proneness, need for 
structure, and narcissism use of confirming statements and use of conflicting statements 
contributed to significant incremental variance in problem recognition (ΔR2 = .18, p < 
.01), identification of critical causes (ΔR2 = .19, p < .01), breadth of constraints (ΔR2 = 
.05, p < .01), and identification of critical constraints (ΔR2 = .07, p < .01). Use of 
confirming statements (and not conflicting statements) contributed to significant 
incremental variance in identification of causes (ΔR2 = .11, p < .01) and quality of 
forecasts (ΔR2 = .04, p < .01). Use of conflicting statements but not confirming 
statements contributed to significant incremental variance for short-term timeframe of 
forecasts (ΔR2 = .04, p < .05). Results indicate partial support for H5a, that individuals 
who use conflicting information will have increased use of sensemaking processes and 
no support for H5b that individuals who use conflicting information will have greater 
decision ethicality.  Interestingly, use of either confirming or conflicting new 
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information did not facilitate overall decision ethicality, suggesting a primacy effect, or 
that initial information about a situation has more influence on decisions. 
Mediation effects of Confirmation Bias 
H6 and H7 predicted confirmation bias would mediate the relationship between 
ethical framing and sensemaking processes and decision ethicality.  H6 and H7 were not 
supported. 
H8, H9, and H10 predicted confirmation bias would mediate the relationship 
between state emotion and (a) sensemaking processes and (b) decision ethicality.  
Mediation was found for several of the sensemaking processes and results are presented 
in Table 11. 
Compared to neutral, both anger and guilt decreased the use of several 
sensemaking processes through the reduced use of conflicting information specifically 
problem recognition (CI.95A = -.155, -.009; CI.95G = -.224, -.066), criticality of causes 
(CI.95A = -.114, -.005; CI.95G = -.160, -.039),  breadth of constraints (CI.95A = -.126, -
.002; CI.95G = -.175, -.015), and criticality of constraints (CI.95A = -.102, -.002; CI.95G = 
-.142, -.019).  Both anger and guilt, compared to neutral, increased the use of two 
sensemaking processes through the decreased use of conflicting information specifically 
short-term timeframe of forecast (CI.95A = .000, .068; CI.95G = .004, .102) and negativity 
of forecast (CI.95A = .000, .116; CI.95G = .007, .172).  These results provide support for 
H8a as those in the neutral condition used conflicting information and engaged in six of 
the ten sensemaking process. 
Both anger and guilt when compared to neutral decreased the use of several 
sensemaking processes through the reduced use of confirming information specifically 
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problem recognition (CI.95A = -.164, -.001; CI.95G = -.189, -.016), number of causes 
(CI.95A = -.379, -.046; CI.95G = -.362, -.028), criticality of causes (CI.95A = -.184, -.024; 
CI.95G = -.175, -.014), breadth of constraints (CI.95A = -.131, -.006; CI.95G = -.130, -
.003), criticality of constraints (CI.95A = -.108, -.011; CI.95G = -.110, -.006), and quality 
of forecast (CI.95A = -.130, -.011; CI.95G = -.128, -.006).  H8a is partially supported 
because participants in the neutral condition used confirming information and engaged 
in six of the ten sensemaking processes.  
H8b was supported.  Both anger and guilt, compared to neutral, had lower 
decision ethicality through the reduced use of conflicting information (CI.95A = -.080, -
.000; CI.95G = -.110, -.006). Anger, compared to guilt, had higher decision ethicality 
through the reduced use conflicting information (CI.95 = .001, .062).   
Anger, compared to guilt, increased the use of several sensemaking processes 
through the reduced use conflicting information specifically problem recognition (CI.95 
= .004, .131), criticality of causes (CI.95 = .003, .089), breadth of constraints (CI.95 = 
.002, .105), and criticality of constraints (CI.95 = .002, .082).  Results for H9a indicated 
that those anger condition used conflicting information less, which increased their use 
of four of the ten sensemaking processes instead of hindering the use of sensemaking 
processes as we predicted. 
This pattern of results suggest that, when a negative emotion is evoked, use of 
additional conflicting or confirming information negatively impacted the sensemaking 
processes of problem recognition, criticality of causes, breadth of constraints, and 
criticality of causes. The negative emotion of anger or guilt combined with use of 
confirming information hurt the processes of number of causes and quality of forecast.  
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The use of conflicting information along with negative emotions lead to short term 
forecasts and negativity of forecasts.  
Discussion 
 This study extends previous literature by examining the effects emotions, 
decision framing, and confirmation bias on ethical sensemaking and ethical decisions.  
It contributes to the understanding of how the framing of information and integral 
emotion induced by the information impact cognition and behavior.  Findings also 
revealed that additional new information which conflicts or confirms with previous 
information can impact ethical sensemaking.  Information that evokes the negative 
emotional response of anger and guilt had negative impacts on sensemaking and anger 
negatively impacted decision ethicality. Additionally, framing information in ethical 
terms had no significant impact on sensemaking or decision ethicality.  We also found 
that use of confirming and use of conflicting information mediated the relationships 
between emotions and sensemaking.  Next, we will review the findings of this study and 
discuss general implications.  We will then discuss theoretical and practical 
implications, and finally we will expand on limitations and areas for future research. 
In line with previous research, the negative emotions of anger and guilt had 
negative impacts on ethical sensemaking (Kligyte et al., 2013; Krishnakuma & Rymph, 
2012; Thiel et al., 2011; Johnson 2015).  One of the goals of this study was to replicate 
findings from Johnson’s study.  This goal was partially fulfilled with three of four 
findings from Johnson’s study being confirmed.   
Johnson (2015) found that participants in the guilt condition identified fewer 
causes than those in the anger condition and neither anger nor guilt were significantly 
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different from the neutral condition.  In this study, those in the neutral condition 
identified a greater number of causes than those in the guilt and anger conditions but 
were not significantly different from each other.  Identification of causes is clearly 
affected by experiencing anger or guilt. The certainty appraisals associated with these 
emotions could lead to more heuristic and less systematic processing of information 
(Tiedens & Linton, 2001; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006) 
In both the Johnson (2015) study and this study, more critical constraints were 
identified in the neutral emotion conditions than the anger conditions.  The action 
tendency associated with anger is to attack the cause of the problem (Averill, 2012).  As 
such, those who feel angry may only see one possible course of action and find it 
unnecessary to think about constraints or factors that can limit potential course of action 
beyond the action they plan to take – attack.  This finding is also in line with certainty 
appraisals experienced with anger and guilt  (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).  When an 
individual is certain about a situation, they will not feel a need to gather more 
information such as other potential causes and constraints. 
Another similarity between the Johnson (2015) study and this study is 
differences in timeframe considered.  In both studies, those in the anger and guilt 
conditions engaged in shorter term forecasts than those in the neutral conditions.  These 
results indicate that negative emotions led to short-term thinking.  Forecasting will 
occur but only for the elements of the situation already identified.  It appears that 
individuals focused on consequences and benefits of alternative courses of action 
needed to get them out of the negative emotional state.  In decision making research, 
those who are guilty focus on the worst case scenario and forecast on how to overcome 
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it and those who are angry focus on the most straightforward outcome without 
exploring alternatives (Gangemi & Mancini, 2007).  In both instances, forecasting is 
short-term and for one possible scenario. 
Anger and fear are similar in levels of certainty appraisal but differ in agency 
(Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).  The differences in agency explain why in both studies, 
anger had significantly lower decision ethicality than those in either the guilt or neutral 
conditions.  The guilt and neutral conditions were not significantly different from each 
other.  When an individual is angry, they focus on the causal agents of the dilemma and 
ruminate (Griffith, Connelly, & Thiel, 2014; Gross & Thompson, 2007).  Whereas, 
when an individual is guilty, they accept the cause and focus on ameliorating it 
(Tangney, 1995).  By identifying the cause and trying to solve the issue and move on 
from the problem, individuals who are experiencing guilt are able to make a more 
ethical decision.  Those who are experiencing anger are focusing on retribution and not 
solving the issue at hand (Lazarus, 1991).  Guilt did not differ from neutral for the 
ethicality of decisions and this may have occurred because guilt is a moral emotion 
(Lazarus, 1991).  Many studies have found guilt-proneness positively influences ethical 
decisions (e.g. Cohen 2010; Agnihotri et al., 2012).   
The rated manipulation check for framing was significant but the self-report 
manipulation check was not significant. This finding suggests that participants were 
primed in how they wrote about the issue with those in the ethical framing condition 
more likely to discuss the issue explicitly as an ethical issue.  When participants were 
asked to report if the issue was an ethical issue (after the open-ended questions), both 
those in the neutral and ethical framing condition identified it as an ethical dilemma. 
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 Framing the problem as an ethical dilemma did not impact sensemaking 
processes and only impacted one of the three components of decision ethicality.  The 
lack of differences between the ethical framing and neutral framing conditions suggests 
that individuals are good at identifying an ethical issue as a problem and engaging in 
sensemaking process in order to solve the problem.  
 The one finding for ethical framing was for the regard for welfare of others 
component of decision ethicality.  This finding suggests that ethical framing is 
important to cue individuals to think about others and how they will be impacted.  Past 
research has shown that individuals will make better ethical decisions when individuals 
are the target of the consequences compared to when the organization is the target (Ness 
& Connelly, in press). Perhaps when an issue is high in ethical salience, individuals are 
more likely to think of how other people will be affected by the dilemma (Jones, 1991). 
Incorporating additional information into one’s already existing understanding 
of an ethical situation can be difficult.  Participants who incorporated both confirming 
and conflicting information, and were in the neutral emotion condition, had better 
problem recognition, cause criticality, breadth of constraints and criticality of 
constraints. In other words, participants who used more information to create their 
understanding of the situation were able to identify important aspects of the situation.  
When participants were able to support initial information about the situation, they were 
able to identify the causes more clearly and were able to develop better forecasts, most 
likely because information that can be corroborated is considered to be more accurate 
and relevant (Postmes, Spears, & Cihangir, 2001).  This is consistent with past research 
that found that participants made poorer ethical decisions and used sensemaking 
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processes less when a competitor offered them uncorroborated information as compared 
to corroborated information (Caughron et al., 2013).  Conflicting information predicted 
short-term forecasts. When participants used conflicting information, they narrowed 
their focus to immediate outcomes.  
The mediational effects of confirming and conflicting information showed that 
participants in both the anger and guilt conditions using confirming and conflicting 
information had worse problem recognition, cause criticality, breadth of constraints and 
constraint criticality. The emotion combined with the use of additional information hurt 
the sensemaking processes. This aligns with previous research where cases with a clear 
description of the social context and goals of the characters lead to a greater use of 
sensemaking process and greater decision ethicality (Bagdasarov et al., 2013).  
When anger was compared to guilt conditions, participants used conflicting 
information less and engaged in the sensemaking processes more.  Angry participants 
avoided information that would dispute their initial viewpoint of the problem but this 
allowed them to continue with the sensemaking processes.  Additionally, this same 
mediation processes led to higher decision ethicality.  Perhaps engaging in confirmation 
bias by avoiding conflicting information allowed participants who felt angry to solve 
the problem.  In this case, confirmation bias was useful. 
Theoretical Implications 
 There are several theoretical implications of this study in the areas of emotions, 
decision framing, and confirmation bias.  This study helps to inform a growing body of 
research on the impact of discrete emotions on ethical sensemaking (Johnson 2015; 
Bagdasarov et al., 2013).  We successfully replicated three of four findings regarding 
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emotions and sensemaking from Johnson’s (2015) study and thus are confident that 
more critical constraints are identified in neutral as compared to anger conditions, long-
term forecast are made in neutral as compared to both anger and guilt conditions, and 
anger results in lower decision ethicality as compared to both guilt and neutral 
conditions.  These findings guide the understanding of discrete emotions and paves the 
way for additional discrete emotions to be examined for how they differentially impact 
sensemaking compared to neutral conditions and compared to each other. 
 This study can help guide the development of our understanding about the 
impact of framing on ethical sensemaking.  Although we found very little with our 
framing condition, only one of our three manipulation checks failed and the neutral 
conditions still saw the problem as having somewhat of an ethical component. The 
failure of one of the manipulation checks and the limited results for ethical framing may 
be due to the comparison of an ethical frame to a neutral frame.  Past research on 
framing often compared two different types of framing (e.g. win-oriented vs. 
cooperation, Schweitzert et al., 2005; loss vs. gain, Kern & Chugh, 2009).  Ethical 
frames should not be completely written off as not effective because future researchers 
can try to induce a stronger ethical frame and should compare ethical frames to other 
frames common in workplace settings. 
 Sensemaking is very complex and how individuals incorporate new information 
into their initial understanding of a situation is important to understand.  This study 
shows that individuals faced with an ethical situation will try to use both confirming and 
conflicting information when they are in a neutral emotional state and this increases the 
use of sensemaking processes.  The negative emotions of anger and guilt reduce the use 
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of both types of information. Our research adds to the understanding of the impact of 
discrete emotions on the processing of new information related to an ethical dilemma. 
Practical Implications 
There are several practical implications of this study.  Anger and guilt 
negatively impact ethical sensemaking process and as such, it is important to discuss 
ways to deal with emotions in any ethics training programs.  Several programs already 
discuss the importance of dealing with one’s emotions and this practice should continue 
(Watts et al., 2016). Additionally, this study shows that using more information will 
improve sensemaking.  Those engaged in ethical dilemmas should attempt to identify 
and incorporate all types of information and try to avoid cognitive shortcuts such as 
confirmation bias.  Ethics training should include a discussion of cognitive biases and 
how they may help or hurt ethical decision making.  Ethics training programs could 
help individuals learn how to identify when they are engaging in biases and provide 
strategies they can utilize to make sure they will make better ethical decisions. 
Social-cognitive theory states that individuals may alter their values and beliefs 
to align with those of a credible role model (Bandura, 1986; 1971). Thus, how a leader 
states or frames an issue may influence the ethical decision making of their 
subordinates. This study found that participants in the ethical framing condition were 
more likely to discuss the problem using ethical terms. Leaders can influence how 
individuals talk about issues and if subordinates all view the problem as ethical, it can 
help them to think of others and be on the same page. This can also alleviate ethical 




 There are several limitations to this study.  First, the ethical problem solving 
experience level of the current sample could limit the generalizability of the findings. 
Many undergraduates have limited exposure to ethical dilemmas and thus have less 
experience in making ethical decisions. However, participants, on average, had almost 
two and half years of work experience. Dunegan, Duchon, and Barton (1992) found that 
college students and business professionals have similar patterns of responses to 
complex, ambiguous organizational scenarios.  Additionally, participants were asked to 
engage in a topic (i.e., marketing) for which they do have knowledge and no issues with 
in past research (e.g., Johnson & Connelly, 2014).  Thus, the findings could potentially 
be replicated in other studies, samples, and scenarios.  This is an area for future 
research. 
 Second, this study used a simulation exercise.  Thus, ethical sensemaking was 
evaluated through coded responses to a hypothetical ethical dilemma which evaluated 
ethical intentions and not actual ethical behavior.  Behavioral intentions are known to 
precede behavior (Ajzen, 1985).  Webb, Miles, and Sheeran (2012) provide meta-
analytic evidence that the relationship between intentions and behavior is moderately 
positive across a wide range of behavioral intentions. 
 Third, ethical dilemmas are inherently emotional (Vitell et al., 2013; Haidt, 
2001) which makes it difficult to evaluate all of the discrete emotions influencing 
ethical decision making.  However, we assessed guilt and anger for all conditions and 
our manipulation check indicated that participants experienced the intended emotion for 
each condition. Thus, the neutral emotion condition was a useful comparison group 
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since participants experienced significantly lower levels of anger and guilt.  However, 
future research could explore additional emotional states and ethical decision making. 
Future Research and Conclusions 
 This study looked at the effects of both conflicting and confirming information 
on ethical sensemaking. In order to tease out the effects of conflicting and confirming 
information, future research could look at the differential effects of confirming 
information and conflicting information on ethical sensemaking by presenting 
participants with just confirming information, just conflicting information, and both. In 
the majority of confirmation bias literature, it is examined by how one choose 
information over the other but what happens when individuals are incorporating both 
pieces of information? 
 Additional studies should examine the nuances with decision ethicality.  Ethical 
framing only impacted one of the three subcomponents of ethicality. Perhaps other 
variables were written off as having no impact on decision ethicality may influence a 
subcomponent of decision ethicality. Certain ethical situations that have an emphasis on 
one the subcomponents over the others could be influenced by these variables. 
The investigation of the effects of discrete emotions on ethical decision making 
is just beginning. Currently, research has examined the roles moral emotions (Hadit, 
2003) on ethical decision making but additional discrete emotions should be examined 
such as sadness, anxiety, and positive emotions like joy.  Research on emotions and 
ethical decision making should look at the impact of emotions at all stages of the ethical 
sensemaking process.  Additionally, research should continue looking at the role of both 
state and trait emotions.  
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 The role of ethics within the workplace continues to be an important area of 
research.  This study contributes to the existing body of literature by examining the 
effects of the anger and guilt, ethics framing, and confirming and conflicting 
information on the ethical sensemaking process. Based on this research and others, 
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You work for Innovation Marketing Inc., a nationwide marketing firm based in 
Houston, Texas that specializes in marketing and advertising research. Within 
Innovation Marketing, there are a number of market research departments, each 
focusing on different types of industries such as automobiles, telecommunications, 
travel, and pharmaceuticals.  
 
Your job is an entry-level marketing research position within the automobile market 
division. This position involves tasks such as collecting and analyzing data on 
customers’ buying habits and product needs and on competitors’ use of sales and 
marketing approaches. In addition, your job involves using this information and other 
data to determine the potential success of a marketing campaign and to measure the 
effectiveness of advertising campaigns once they are launched. You have been in this 
position with Innovation Marketing for a little less than a year. 
 
The two primary individuals you work with in your research division are Jason and 
Davis. Jason is in his second year at Innovation Marketing, and you have a good 
working relationship with him. Davis is the manager of your market division, he pushes 
his team to produce results quickly. Both you and Jason have generous salaries and 
commission opportunities thanks mostly to Davis’ connections within the automobile 
industry.   
 






Innovation Marketing Inc. Case with Manipulations 
 




Innovation Marketing Inc. was hired by Sooner Auto Co. to create a marketing 
campaign for its newest hybrid car. Davis, the division’s market research manager, 
generates reports on the cars’ available features (e.g. leather interiors, GPS navigation, 
sunroof, etc.) and technical specifications (e.g. horsepower, fuel economy, transmission, 
etc.) to be included in any marketing research endeavors. Sooner Auto hired Innovation 
Marketing due to Innovation Marketing’s reputation of consistently completing market 
research in a timely and budget friendly manner. Sooner Auto fully expects Innovation 
Marketing’s final marketing plan to be on time and on budget, or they will move their 
business to another marketing company.  
 
You and Jason are assigned with gathering data to determine the potential success of a 
marketing campaign for the hybrid car through focus groups and surveys in a local 
market. Before developing the marketing analysis materials, you were Jason was [the 
research group was] tasked with reviewing Davis’ features and technical specifications 
report, which is usually long and technical, to create a summary of the car’s available 
features and technical specifications for you and Jason to include when developing your 
research materials. Although this usually takes several days, you have Jason has [the 
group has] done this numerous times in the past, so you Jason skimmed the report [was 
skimmed] quickly to generate the shortened document to allow the group to move 
forward quickly on the marketing research. 
 
A few months later, the data from the market analyses are presented to Davis and 
representatives of Sooner Auto. Everyone is thrilled with the results. The positive 
reactions to the upcoming availability of the hybrid car, in addition to the car’s available 
features and technical specifications, position the car to be highly successful and well-
received. Based on this information, Sooner Auto decides to develop and launch a 
nation-wide campaign within the next month. As you are writing up the final reports of 
the marketing analyses, you realize that several of the technical specifications were left 
off the list that you Jason [the research group] used in the focus groups and surveys. 
You think the technical specifications left off the list are mostly standard, so they 







A couple days later, you receive an email from Jason: 
 
             From :      Jason Baker  <jbaker@innomark.com>    




 I just talked to Davis, and we really need to get the final report you have been 
working on for the recent market analyses we completed. David said to me that this 
project must go well or my job could be in jeopardy. I can’t afford to lose this job. Plus, 
it would be hard to find another job in this industry after being fired from working with 






When you read this email, you are in disbelief that you have put Jason in this situation. 
If you had just paid attention to the report the first time around, this whole situation 
could have been easily avoided. And now your one mistake could cost Jason his job. 
You realize how unfair the entire situation is for him. How could you let this happen? 
You feel a knot form in the pit of your stomach, and you become overwhelmed with 




A couple days later, you receive an email from Jason: 
 
             From :      Jason Baker  <jbaker@innomark.com>    




 I just talked to Davis, and he really needs the final report you have been working 
on for the recent market analyses we completed. Davis said to me that this project must 
go well or your job could be in jeopardy. I know you can’t afford to lose this job. Plus, 
it would be hard to find another job in this industry after being fired from working with 





When you read this email, you are in disbelief that Jason has put you in this dilemma. If 
he had just paid attention to the report the first time around, this whole situation could 
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have been easily avoided. And now Jason’s one mistake could cost you your job! You 
realize how unfair the entire situation is. How could he do this do you? You feel your 
face get hot and your hands clench into fists. You begin to experience waves of intense 




A couple days later, you receive an email from Jason: 
 
             From :      Jason Baker  <jbaker@innomark.com>    




 I just talked to Davis, and we really need to get the final report you have been 









Ethical Framing Manipulation 
Neutral Framing: 
A week goes by and you think about what to do next. As you think about this, you 
realize leaving several technical specifications off the list may have implications for the 
project. 
Ethical Framing: 
A week goes by and you think about what to do next. As you think about this, you 
realize leaving several technical specifications off the list may have ethical implications 






Key: Confirming statements are bold. Order of statements was randomized for each 
participant. 
You are unsure how to proceed. During the next week, new information comes to light 
that may be important to consider. 
When you tell your coworker Adam that you are feeling stressed this week, he 
sympathizes and tells you, “Davis really encourages us to get work done quickly. 
He is very results oriented and expects us to accomplish a lot of work in a 
relatively short period of time.” 
You look over Davis’ original report. It is long and went into detail about every 
available feature and technical specification. 
You come across an article discussing the methods involved in focus group research. 
The article showed that when focus groups were given additional facts about a product, 
the reactions of the participants were different than focus groups that did not receive the 
additional facts, all other information being the same between groups. 
You review the list and discover some of the technical specifications left of the list were 
new features introduced this year by Sooner Auto. 
You tell your coworker Michael that you may have misquoted some information to a 
client. He tells you, “The most important issue to the automobile industry is getting the 
correct information. It is better to have a reputation based on quality. I want marketing 
research to be seen as a science and trusted by the public.” 
You tell your coworker Christina that you are afraid of possibly losing a client. She tells 
you, “In my experience, most clients stay with Innovation Marketing even if the work 
takes longer than predicted. Even though this could cost the client more money, they 
stay with us because they are already invested.” 
You see on the company calendar that Sooner Auto is on track to roll out their 
nationwide campaign this month. 
You get an email from your contact at Sooner Auto saying they are really excited 
that the project is on track and they can’t wait to begin the ad campaign. 
You look over the presentation given to Davis and the representatives of Sooner 
Auto which includes the list of features and technical specifications you used in the 
marketing research and analyses is in the presentation. Everyone approved the 
presentation. 
While reading Marketing in the Auto Industry you come across an article stating how it 
is a common business practice to not report all of the specifications in advertisements.  
